JUNE OF 2013 WAS SUPPOSED TO SHOWCASE THE RISE OF BRAZIL on the global stage as the country hosted the Confederations Cup, a kind of rehearsal for the 2014 World Cup. That month, millions of people took to the streets of several major cities in a wave of protests that initially enjoyed broad public support. We have recently seen mega-events in China and South Africa framed as spectacles of emerging markets, but unwittingly serving to showcase local shortcomings. Something similar happened in Brazil’s case, with urban issues at the forefront. In November of 2009, The Economist had published a cover with an image of Rio de Janeiro’s famous Redeeming Christ statue as a rocket, and the headline “Brazil takes off.” This cover appeared in countless presentations in academia and the business world, illustrating the country’s newfound protagonism. Brazil was slated to host both the World Cup and the Olympics. The country seemed to perform well during the 2007-08 crisis, while enjoying a period of strengthening democratic institutions, economic growth, and advances in addressing socio-economic inequalities. So how to make sense of the protests?

President Dilma’s 79% approval ratings in March of 2013 dropped to 45% in June.2 She was re-elected in 2014, but the political landscape has since become increasingly polarized, and the economy entered a slump.3 By September of 2013, The Economist already saw fit to update its narrative in a cover with Rio’s Christ-rocket about to crash, and the question: “Has Brazil blown it?” The magazine had a more definitive answer in a January 2016 cover with the headline “Brazil’s Fall.” In presentations, the original cover now tends to elicit laughter, directed either at the magazine’s boosterism or at Brazil’s aspirations—depending on one’s leanings. Brazil’s relatively rapid swing from a mood of confidence to uncertainty, from boom to bust, is certainly not without precedent. But the combination of massive urban protests and international attention in the run-up to mega-events can introduce new lines of thought. What might the events in Brazil teach us about broader, global developments?

According to a quip sometimes attributed to Alfred Hitchcock, the problem isn’t to begin with a cliché, but to end in one. So we could begin with Tom Jobim’s well-known remark that “Brazil is not for beginners.” Or we could quote a slogan found in posters during what became known as the June Journeys: “If you are not confused, you’re not paying attention.” Most analysts, nonetheless, agree on some elements behind the protests. The initial manifestations, not yet on a national scale, had to do with mobility, organized in São Paulo by groups like the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Fare Movement) opposing a raise on bus fares. Images of police

2. According to CNI-IBOPE. In the same polls, evaluations of the government as excellent or good fell from 63% to 31% during the same period. By December of 2015, Dilma’s approval had collapsed to 14%, and only 9% considered her government excellent or good. This data can be accessed at http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/cni/publicacoes-e-estatisticas/estatisticas/2015/12/142615/pesquisa-cni-ibopeco-de-governo.html.
3. Dilma was re-elected with 51.6% of the vote. In 2015, the Brazilian economy contracted, and unemployment rose.
brutality against protesters circulated widely on the internet, giving the movement greater visibility and support, attracting larger, sympathetic crowds. Discontentment over the costs and preparations for mega-events served as a catalyst—all of this took place days before the Confederations Cup began. And we must take into account the impact of manifestations in Turkey, the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, Los Indignados, etc.4

A more diffuse but salient “crisis of representation” also bears mention—we could include under this umbrella a host of causes that were perceived as being sidestepped in conventional political venues, including human rights and political reform. Ronaldo Lemos compared the heterogeneity of causes espoused on the streets to a Facebook timeline. In fact, one of the recurrent slogans invited observers to leave behind social media, and join protestors on the streets. Last, a critique of corruption emerged. In later months, with scandals involving Petrobras (Brazil’s semi-public multi-national energy corporation), construction companies and much of the political class, corruption gained centrality to a different set of protests—seemingly veering toward the right, and in direct opposition to the Workers’ Party.5

Rather than engage in important but particular debates about Brazilian politics, I would like to suggest that the 2013 wave of protests in Brazil’s cities, much like its precursors and counterparts elsewhere, can be understood as part of a contested field of visions and narratives about urban, national, planetary futures. Conflicting criteria and imaginations of what constitutes development or progress raise questions about who or what belongs in the future. Science fiction author William Gibson has voiced the idea that “the future is already here, it’s just not very evenly distributed.”6 To Karl Marx, “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.”7 Both take the uneven distribution of technological advancements as a premise. But in the context of environmental pressures already unleashed by climate change or distribution of technological advancements as a premise. But in the context of environmental pressures already unleashed by climate change or degradation of ecosystems, their notion of future gains new meaning: it works as much for calamity as for prosperity. The Anthropocenic future is already here for all that lose traditional livelihoods to the march of progress or in the name of development.

This is not to imply that the urban protests in question should somehow be interpreted as primarily driven by ecological consciousness, far from it. Rather, the point is to reflect about what sort of urban subjects the so-called Anthropocene forges. Those of us living today are among the first members of our species capable of imagining an end to humanity, or to the world as we know it, completely outside of messianic, apocalyptic, or eschatological narratives. A secular imagination suffices. If the Cold War introduced fears of nuclear annihilation with a powerful sense of immediacy, climate change generates anxieties fueled by a sense of inevitability: the timebomb is already ticking.

The condition of having to contend with foreclosed futures is now widespread and global, but it is certainly not new. In Brazil, for example, aborted futures are part of a much more immediate horizon for residents of favelas or urban peripheries, due to mass incarceration and devastating rates of violent death, particularly among young black males. If lack of prospects is a component of abyssal wealth inequality anywhere in the world, in parts of urban Brazil, actual lives are routinely curtailed by guns, drug traffic and police violence—with numbers comparable to a war zone’s.8 As in other places in the Americas, the War on Drugs was waged on the poor, and disproportionately on the young. It left behind countless dead bodies, dismembered communities, and atrophied imaginations of the future.

In different ways, in city planning, the horizon of the future has also changed dramatically over the past few decades. In Latin America, as elsewhere in the Western hemisphere, twentieth-century utopian modernism largely gave place to acupuncture urbanism. Laudable as they may be, bottom-up or hyper-localized approaches can hardly tackle the scale of current challenges in mobility, water management, or sanitation, for example. Mega-events therefore present rare opportunities for cities to attempt to re-shape their futures. In the case of preparations for the World Cup and Olympics in Brazil, it became spectacularly clear that the priorities of a relative few guided most major policy and investment decisions.

Besides the many specific grievances, I would like to propose that anxieties about who or what has a place in the future animate the cycle of protests to which the “June Journeys” belonged. And that such movements, despite their heterogeneity, should collectively be understood as a push for what we may deem a “right to the future,” echoing Henri Lefebvre’s

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4. On the 2015 mass demonstrations in Brazil, including their relationship to global developments, see the collection Clodades Rebêlo and São Paulo: Boitempo, 2013.
5. In one protest, for example, the majority of those in attendance voted for the runner-up in the 2014 elections. See Mariana Desidério, “82% dos Manifestantes de Domingo Votaram Em Aécio Neves,” Exame, 17 March 2015, http://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/noticias/82-dos-manifestantes-de-domingo-votaram-em-aecio-neves/, accessed April 13, 2015. 75% of Brazilians approve of the manifestations against Dilma’s government. In another Datafolha poll released on April 13, 2015, corruption appears for the first time as the country’s leading problem, in the opinion of 34% of respondents. These polls are available at http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br.
call for a “right to the city.” A slogan graffitied in walls of Italian cities like Pisa and Prato encapsulates part of this sentiment: *voi ci rubote il futuro, nooi ci riprendiamo la città.* “You that stole the future, we that take back the city.” In Brazil, it is fitting to recontextualize the phrase in a context of cumulative processes of rapid and overwhelming urbanization, along with the ecological underpinnings of apprehensions about the future—and of the demands that the built environment places on other means of being, including those of Amerindians and forest peoples. It is increasingly difficult not to be sensitive to how nations of the so-called Global South are being resignified as emerging markets at the same time as the economic growth agenda continues to give signs of being incompatible with environmental sustainability. Tensions between developmental aspirations and concern with the planet’s future play themselves out uniquely in much of Latin America: on the one hand, the region concentrates crucial natural resources, on the other, it is already the world’s most urbanized.

But before proceeding with the instabilities of prospects in the present, let us return to Brazil's own histories of contested—and frustrated—futures. The country, often identified as edenic in early modernity, was famously hailed by Stefan Zweig as “a land of the future,” in a widely translated book with that title. Zweig had been one of the world’s most popular writers in the 1920s and 30s. The prediction eventually became a running joke: Brazil is the country of the future, and always will be. Even before *The Economist* pronounced its take-off, there had been moments from the 1940s until the early 60s “when Brazil was modern.” to quote the title of a book by architecture historian Lauro Cavalcanti. Time magazine, in a February 13, 1956 issue, published an image of Brazil’s recently inaugurated president Juscelino Kubitschek, who promised “Fifty Year’s Progress in Five.” In the cover’s background, a stylized map of the continent showed Brazil’s territory containing a forested North, in contrast to an urban skyline in the South. From the geographic center, a statuesque body takes-off, “where the poor can get around in a car, but where even the rich use public transport.” Indeed, car ownership in Brazil more than doubled from 2000 until 2010, and in most large cities, poor and rich alike have a hard time getting around in traffic—though in São Paulo, the wealthiest now resort to helicopters to avoid traffic jams. Standstill traffic in the country’s largest cities is part of what creates the sensation of declining quality of life to those that took to the streets in June of 2013.

But back to the 1940s. Stefan Zweig’s vision of Brazil as a land of the future had little to do with the country’s early embrace of modernist architecture and urbanism, nor would it align with *The Economist’s* growth agenda. To the Jewish-born novelist, who had fled the Nazis, the world would only have a future if it were to be more like Brazil. He asks: “How can human beings achieve a peaceful coexistence on earth, in spite of all the different races, classes, colors, religions and convictions?” To him, no country had solved that problem like Brazil, “perhaps the most important contribution to doing away with a delusion that has brought more discord from the early pursuit of modern, car-centric visions of the future, dating back to the 1920s. This process continued unabated throughout the twentieth century, and seems to have accelerated under the Workers’ Party.” During Lula’s presidency (2002–2010), the government continuously provided incentives to the automobile industry. In 2009, Lula declared that he wanted “the poor to have cars too,” chastising those defending investment in public transport for “wanting the poor to free up the streets for them.” In one fell swoop, he evokes class—conflict and George W. Bush’s “ownership society.”

If Brazilian investment on the automobile had been pioneering, current federal policies are now largely out of step with the forefront of urbanism. Lula’s quote stands in stark contrast to the position of Bogotá’s former mayor, Enrique Peñalosa, fond of saying that “an advanced city” is not one “where the poor can get around in a car, but where even the rich use public transport.” Indeed, car ownership in Brazil more than doubled from 2000 until 2010, and in most large cities, poor and rich alike have a hard time getting around in traffic—though in São Paulo, the wealthiest now resort to helicopters to avoid traffic jams. Standstill traffic in the country’s largest cities is part of what creates the sensation of declining quality of life to those that took to the streets in June of 2013.


Critics of such modernizing plans were often dismissed as nostalgic, or told to wait and see: the future would fulfill all promises, and sacrifices would be redeemed. Such lines of thinking might recall the unshakeable faith in certain quarters that technological innovation will save us from ecological doom. But in the case of urban Brazil, the future, as always, did not turn out as it was supposed to—for bad and for good. As after earlier belle époque reforms, a monumental avenue built in Rio de Janeiro during the 1940s, meant as a stage for military processions, became appropriated by revelers during carnival parties and popular protests. At least temporarily, and periodically, people now make their own places that were not meant for them.

And it is worthwhile to once again state, as in the introduction to this volume, a recurrent “lesson” from the history of city planning: the unintended happens all the time, the improbable happens often. To which, before proceeding, we can add a corollary: history (like World Cups) might only make sense in retrospect, but in retrospect, always makes sense. Ongoing, though sometimes sublimated, tensions over who and what streets or public spaces are for have been a defining characteristic of many Brazilian cities. Along with disputes over what futures Brazil might contain and unleash, they are very much part of what was at play during the World Cup—and might help us to unlock the puzzle of the June Journeys.

During the 2007-08 crisis, amid a seemingly growing sense of instability and even dark days ahead, in global trend surveys Latin Americans—Brazilians in particular—tended to be more optimistic about the future than residents of other regions. However seriously these surveys should be taken, they certainly speak to advertisers and business people. In the past few years, the HSBC bank had a global ad campaign which we could read as a direct response to the question of who belongs in the future. Called “be part of the future,” it contained promises like: “In the future, south–south trade will be norm not novelty,” and “In the future, there will be no markets left waiting to emerge.” The Brazilian version, ubiquitous in airports, adds the phrase: “A new world is emerging. Be part of it.” This interpellation can be interpreted as promising or threatening, depending on one’s economic conditions and yearnings. To many, being part of this emerging new world is of course not simply a matter of choice.

Incongruities between rhetorics of inclusion and practices of exclusion, a feature of Brazilian political life since at least the interwar period, have re-emerged in the period around the organization of mega-events. If HSBC advertises a future that the individual must seize, the Brazilian federal government’s slogan for much of the Workers’ Party’s tenure, “Brazil, a country of all,” taps into the inclusive vision that Zweig and others articulated in the first half of the twentieth century. In a way, the election of Lula in 2002—a charismatic former union leader who rose from poverty—seems to have tapped into deep-seated messianic strains in Luso-Brazilian culture. In the documentary Entretatos or Intermissions, a man on motorcycle approaches the then candidate to offer some encouragement: “C’mon, we are believing in you, the last hope, if you’re done we don’t believe in anything anymore.” That scene, after

19. Ibid, 12.
21. This was the case for expectations of “life in five years,” according to Gallup Analytics (data available at www.gallup.com). In the same surveys, the percentages of respondents in Latin America that saw national economies and standards of living “getting better” suffered a comparatively more modest decline, a trend that reversed after 2012.
22. And indeed, significant transfer of wealth programs helped to reduce Brazil’s poverty and extreme poverty by more than half between 2003 and 2013. As of yet, this proceeded without stirring racial tensions of the sort we might see in US and Europe, though backlash against such programs appears to be rapidly gaining ground. That slogan was replaced with another declaring “a rich country is a country without poverty” (“Pais rico é país sem pobreza”). On poverty reduction, see Mariana Ceratti’s “How to Reduce Poverty: A New Lesson from Brazil for the World” (http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/03/22/mundo-sin-pobreza-leccion-brasil-mundo-bolsa-familiar), and Tereza Campello and Marcelo Côrtes Neto’s “Programa Bolsa-Familia: uma década de inclusão e cidadania” (http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20408).
Lula’s subsequent acts as a popular two-term president now mired in accusations, begins to function as an omen. Messianic, Brazilian hopes for redemptive justice lie dormant, perhaps even irrevocably damaged, amid disillusionment and frustration.

The June Journeys of 2013, however, during the first term of Lula’s anointed successor Dilma, brought together not just discontent, but also aspirations toward better futures. “Tomorrow will be greater” was one of its mottos. It is not far-fetched to suggest that the results and repercussions of mega-event urbanism had a role in foreclosing that sense of possibilities. Later cycles of manifestations in 2015-16 seemed to follow more of a revanchist logic, pitting political tendencies, groups or factions in opposition: against corruption, the Worker’s Party, Dilma’s impeachment, threats to democracy, even “against everything out there.”24 The less polarized protests of June 2013 were a largely inter-class phenomena, and as mentioned, they initially targeted public transportation deficiencies, ballooning once images on social media showed protestors and journalists mistreated by the police.25 The Confederations Cup, an official rehearsal to the World Cup, certainly served as a catalyst. As word got out about how FIFA operates, and what hosting mega-events actually entails, the perception of a disconnect between branding and reality seemed to touch a nerve. Regardless of how precisely people identified the interests and players involved, the mega-event scheme became clear enough to many, Brazilians foot the bill, but don’t get to keep the bounty. Favorable legislation for FIFA and its sponsors included generous tax exemptions. Extensive “exclusive zones” around venues kept local businesses from benefitting.26 On the one hand, as with Rio’s Pan-American Games in 2007, the World Cup was marked by major cost overruns, and the usual stories of kick-backs and inflated budgets.27

On the other, much of the promised public transportation infrastructure was never built or completed.28 To the many who could care less about sports, all of this is offensive for self-evident reasons; and, to the many who care deeply about such events, but could not afford or secure tickets, it became clear that they were going to be left out—regardless of what the government, FIFA, the IOC (International Olympic Committee), or any corporate sponsor promised.

During the build-up to World Cup, a series of Itaú bank ads broadcast in Brazil showed an ultra-modern stadium rising from the earth. The commercial opens with a view of South America from space, highlighting Brazil’s borders, followed by sequences of shots of glorious natural landscapes and awed spectators, as the stadium stands emerge from the ground. In the continent of magical realism, this resembled a feat of what we may deem magical capitalism. As if by a spell of magic, supernaturally, the stadium materializes without any labor or cost. Latent in these images is an expectation that the financial mechanisms through which banks manage money, and through which stadiums get built, are of little importance. As when reading a novel by Gabriel García Márquez, we are asked to suspend our disbelief. The ad, which appeared on television as well as digital and printed media, offered a straightforward enough metaphor, with obvious emotional appeal. The whole country becomes a stadium, with everyone inside as enthralled World Cup spectators, united in support of the national team. No room for dissent, no way of escaping. The commercial ends with another view from space, with Brazil standing out from the globe as a giant stadium, where the stands follow the contours of the nation’s borders.

This commercial might help to illustrate how the World Cup and the Olympics could be seen as a victory lap for a mode of fortress architecture, with little room for permeability. You are either in or you are out. Just as the HSBC ad campaign implies that there is no future in the old or in supposedly anachronistic practices, the new “modern” stadiums (often deemed arenas) built over the past few years in Brazil disrupt traditional notions of stands as a type of public space. There is a parallel here to the process of corridor streets replaced by expressways in a certain planning idiom. The latter reduces the possibilities of chance encounters, contact with difference, and political life. FIFA expects each “Stadium Visitor” to adhere to a code of conduct, which prohibits the unsanctioned promotion of “any political, ideological messages or any charitable cause.”29 The IOC likewise often operates under the pretense that sporting events are unrelated to politics.30

Stadiums like the Maracanã, built for the 1950 World Cup, had acted as spaces of exceptional egalitarianism amid staggering inequalities. Albeit

24. The phrase “contra tudo que está aí” has become recurrent.
26. For more on “inclusive zones,” see Christopher Galfrey’s “The traumas and dramas of post-Cup, pre-Olympic Brazil” (http://roarmag.org/essays/brazil-world-cup-olympics), and on exclusivity to tax exemptions and commercial rights, see Matt Sandy’s “How Brazil’s traditional food vendors took on FIFA and won” (http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/17/brazil-vendors-fifa.html).
27. Zoe Rollers’ “Lessons from the Pan-American Games” examines further the effect the games had on pre-Olympic Brazil (https://roarmag.org/essays/brazil-world-cup-olympics), and on exclusivity to tax exemptions and commercial rights, see Matt Sandy’s “How Brazil’s traditional food vendors took on FIFA and won” (http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/17/brazil-vendors-fifa.html).

highly gendered, stands allowed for encounters and conviviality between people from a wide range of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. Stadiums stood apart from the general patterns of Brazilian society, where access to goods and rights is as a rule uneven. Maracanã of course dates to an era when mega-events demanded far less, capacity could reach 180,000, and tickets were affordable. There is another revealing change: today, in narratives like the Itaú bank ad, the stadium is proposed as a metonym for the nation precisely at a moment when it ceases being so in at least one very meaningful way. Instead of being metonymic of a culture of mixture, or of Zweig’s vision of a harmonious Brazil, stadium stands became metonymic of segregationist urbanism. In other words, stadiums became much more representative of socio-economic divisions.\textsuperscript{31} To that end, though not without pushback, increased sectorization in the stands has been the tendency.\textsuperscript{32} Many formerly municipal or public stadiums are now managed by private consortium. This is not to romanticize the state of Brazilian sporting venues before preparations for recent mega-events. As a rule, they were woefully mismanaged, and in many cases, in serious need of repairs and updates. As cultural spaces, stands often reproduced some of the most exciting and vibrant aspects of Brazil’s street life. But beginning in the 1990s, like cities, they also experienced a rise in violence. Concern with safety is obviously legitimate and crucial, but it became a decay in the modernization of stadiums. As elsewhere, ”modernization” in practice has often meant more amenities, capacity reduction and higher ticket prices. Even when official explanations emphasize safety concerns, new designs clearly privilege notions of stadiums as places of private profit and entertainment rather than as public spaces—despite taxpayers so often footing the bill.\textsuperscript{33}

The Maracanã, host to the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympics, provides an object lesson. The stadium, once the world’s largest by capacity, underwent a major reform in the late 1990s, and another before the 2007 Pan-American Games. For the 2013 Confederations Cup and the ensuing mega-events, the stadium was essentially rebuilt, with little left besides the shell of the original structure. The demolition of integral elements of its design, including the stands and concrete roof, trampled over preservation laws.\textsuperscript{34} The total cost of these interventions amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds.\textsuperscript{35} Whereas the original Maracanã contained a standing-only section with popular prices, the new stadium prioritizes luxury boxes, where supposed VIPs can be kept at a comfortable remove from crowds. The original’s scale and acoustics sometimes created the sensation of an otherworldly space, and it was often deemed “a temple.”\textsuperscript{36} The new stadium seeks to function as a giant television studio, and looks as flashy as it is generic. This is not just a question of nostalgia, to be sure. Renovations could have co-existed with what had made the Maracanã into such an extraordinary building.

These changes signal toward a broader shift, not exclusive to Brazil, where those in attendance go from being active participants to more passive spectators, and finally, mere consumers—recalling Guy Debord’s notion of the ”society of the spectacle” as marked by a shift from \textit{being} into \textit{having}, and from \textit{having} into \textit{appearing}.\textsuperscript{37} This represents a departure from a longstanding tradition that gives as much emphasis to the drama that plays itself out in the stands, as to the game within the sidelines—where the stadium experience is often marked by rich and layered soundscapes, including call and response, irreverent song parodies, adaptations of musical standards and hits.\textsuperscript{38} In contrast, the new models of assigned seating and jumbotrons tend toward soundscapes that are pre-established, recorded, and controlled by speakers. The range of behaviors narrows, and the ”stadium experience” becomes more standardized. In the age of smartphones and social media, part of what is now sold is the right to prove you were there.

\textsuperscript{31} Christopher Gaffney elaborates in "The traumas and dramas of post-Cup, pre-Olympic Brazil" on these divisions by marking that "Ticket prices for Brazilian football matches have increased 300% in ten years and are the most expensive in the world relative to minimum wage" (https://roomag.org/essays/brasil-world-cup-olympic).

\textsuperscript{32} For more, see “Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas” (https://comitepopulariowordpress.com/).

\textsuperscript{33} The cost for the World Cup stadium in Brazil, Estádio Nacional Mané Garrincha, cost $900 million to build although it was originally projected to be only $500 million (Andrew Zimbalist, "Get Ready for a Massive World Cup Hangover, Brazil." Time, June 27, 2014, http://time.com/2950699/world-cup-brazil-spotlight).


\textsuperscript{36} In matches Rio’s local teams, fans of rival clubs concentrate behind each of the goals. Often, when an opposing team scored, you could see an explosion of ecstatic bodies across the stadium before the wave of celebratory sounds arrived.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{37} Guy Debord in \textit{The Society of the Spectacle}, fragment 17, writes: “An earlier stage in the economy’s domination of social life entailed an obvious downgrading of being into having that left its stamp on all human endeavor. The present stage, in which social life is completely taken over by the accumulated products of the economy, entails a generalized shift from having to appearing: all effective “having” must now derive both its immediate prestige and its ultimate raison d’être from appearances. At the same time all individual reality, being directly dependent on social power and completely shaped by that power, has assumed a social character. Indeed, it is only inasmuch as individual reality is not that it is allowed to appear” (1995, 16).

\textsuperscript{38} These are sometimes “unsavory” and can include offensive chants and taunts, often with racist, misogynist or homophobic overtones. There is not quite anything paralleling European cases where hooligans and more fanatic elements within fan bases often have established connections with right wing extremism.
In June of 2013, I joined protestors in Rio’s streets. The first thing that struck me was a repertoire of chants, gestures and dispositions that immediately recalled the stands of stadiums like the Maracanã. It is perhaps not by chance that this happened precisely when the new Maracanã, re-opened for the Confederations Cup, was set to become a stage for opening ceremonies catering to the expectations of a global audience and FIFA’s corporate sponsors. Largely insipid, heavily-scripted official parties, in a country where infinitely rich and exciting manifestations remain a staple of popular culture. And yet, in the streets of Rio, it seemed to me as if the old Maracanã re-surfaced.

In June of 2013, it was as if many Brazilians discovered the fact that they were hosting a global party to which only a select few had been invited, in a country branded beyond recognition. On Brazil’s third game in the Northeastern city of Fortaleza, during a spontaneous response to an apparent technological glitch, there emerged a brief possibility of convergence between the mega-event spectacle and local expression. After the sound system stopped playing the instrumental version of Brazil’s anthem, the crowd continued singing acapella. Several players reaffirmed or declared their support for the manifestations. Brazil’s national team went on to win the Confederations Cup.

A certain minimum consensus of support for the protests quickly broke down—as political cleavages became more pronounced, and as several of the manifestations turned violent, resulting from actions by the military police and by groups amid protestors, like the black blocs. Support for the World Cup remained relatively low—down to around 50% after a high of nearly 80% when the country’s selection as host was announced. It was almost as if the discontentment constituted an unconscious reaction against clichés that Brazilians are soccer-crazed, and would value hosting a World Cup above anything else. At the same time, the opposition to the mega-event could in fact perfectly co-exist with appreciation for the sport. The slogan-hashtag #NãoVaiTerCopa (There Won’t be a World Cup), often interpreted as intransigent, rather spoke to the cognitive dissonance that the event produced. To say that the Cup would not happen, was also a way of saying: “There won’t be a World Cup as far as I’m concerned, either because I am not represented in how the event was put together, or because none of the investments will benefit me.” The many ironic references to the Padrão FIFA (FIFA Standard) likewise denounced the double-standards of mega-events: FIFA’s standards were invoked to justify costly stadium reforms, so protestors asked that the same high standards be applied to public health, education, etc. These discourses constitute, in effect, a protest over a right to shape the future.

The June Journeys were a highly mediatic and politically charged event, but they also contained some of the embodied dimensions that compel people to attend stadiums, or street celebrations like carnival. There was an aspect of the protests that a joke at the time intuitively captured: some referred to the manifestations, or manifestações in Portuguese, as mani-festações, as in festa or party. This might harken back to disdainful portrayals of the opposition to Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985) as a “festive left.” But more straightforwardly, it simply recognizes the allure and thrill of the streets. The protests become an opportunity to occupy public spaces, to take the streets back from cars, to see and be seen. The street, in other words, as an event.

During the 2014 World Cup, protests were largely suppressed or subdued, in comparison with June of 2013. Organizers found the mega-event to be a very successful party, and Brazilians increasingly embraced it—support edged back up to over 60% as the games progressed. As a soccer aficionado, I confess to having found myself enthralled, for much of it. There are all sorts of less generous and perfectly valid explanations for the World Cup’s popularity soaring among Brazilians, including the impact of media campaigns and stifling of dissent. But in my view, at least some of it can be attributed to a different sort of street occupation—the largely unforeseen “invasion” of soccer fans from neighboring countries, many in improvised and makeshift conditions, sleeping in vans or cars. In several host cities, certainly in Rio, this occupation introduced a festivity to the event, marked by irreverent taunting and camaraderie, overtaking buttoned up protocols.

Occasional alterations aside, the presence of Argentinians, Chileans, Colombians, Ecuadorians or Uruguayans seemed to activate a relationship to the streets that in spite of decades of car-centric urbanism, still runs deep in Brazil’s urban cultures. The mostly unsanctioned celebrations and gatherings that took over street corners and public squares throughout the country offered a counterpoint to ideas of what “modern” stadiums ought to be like, and to modernist ideas of what streets ought to be for. In limited but tangible ways, such unplanned occupations offer a glimpse of the resilient forms of sociability, vitality, and affinity to sidewalks and corridor streets that have helped to shape Brazilian popular culture. And if, through recourse to “magical capitalism,” various corporations seek to channel this festive energy into the commodification machine that World Cups have become, then soccer itself reminded us that part of its powerful appeal is in defying predictability. Advertisers could turn Brazil into a stadium as if by magic, but no magic could suffice to make an ill-prepared


national team compete against a talented German side. In the semi-final, defying even the gloomiest predictions, Brazil suffered the most surprising and humiliating defeat in its sporting history, 7x1.

Studying the past often reminds us that any given “present” moment can serve as proof of the future’s unpredictability. The future always makes sense, but only after it happens. In 1950, after Brazil’s defeat at home against Uruguay in the World Cup final, one headline read: “the impossible happened.” A famous writer, Nelson Rodrigues, would refer to that match as Brazil’s Hiroshima. This time around, it seems, the defeat was treated more lightly. Few operated under the impression that the nation’s destiny had been at stake. Nonetheless, narratives of Brazil as the country of football, and at least for now, as “land of the future,” are put to rest. But the 2013 protests and the 2014 parties in the streets of urban Brazil, in a way, brought back to the surface certain deeply-rooted everyday practices and forms of sociability. Mixed and messy. In these cases, to occupy streets is a way of claiming the right to a future seemingly reserved for mega-spectacles. Or rather, of claiming a right to modes of occupying urban spaces that certain visions of the future discard as obsolete, useless, even threatening.

In this regard, the legacy of Rio de Janeiro’s Olympic urbanism proves to be illustrative. The history of planning certainly reserves plenty of surprises, and some interventions connected to Rio’s moment as an Olympic City warrant ambivalence, and in some cases, optimism. But the unpredictability of urban futures should not inhibit urbanists from the types of exercises in “anticipatory history” now underway in connection to climate and environmental change. The model which Rio’s Olympic urbanism favored in the West Zone do not lend themselves to the sorts of re-appropriations of space that occurred after earlier urban reforms in the city. Spontaneous occupations become a bit harder to imagine amid its dispersion, walled-in open spaces (functioning as voids rather than solids), and general lack of public squares or corridor streets at a human, legible, inhabitable scale.

Of course, disproportionate investment in these high-rise and sprawling urban models was not something created in the context of Rio’s Olympics. On the contrary, Olympic urbanism simply reinforced a pattern that Barra’s success as a real estate proposition had established since the 1980s. But as much as it might be prudent to reserve judgment of Olympic legacies, we can assess the experiment as a major missed opportunity, or as a doubling down on previous mistakes. A new “City of the Arts” complex, built in Barra at the cost of over $250 million in public funds, can help to put into perspective the folly of prioritizing this area of the city. The design itself, by Christian de Portzamparc, is compelling and full of surprises. The French architect incorporates recurrent elements from some of Brazil’s most memorable modernist buildings, including sinuous lines, pilotis, reflecting pools, and the use of reinforced concrete. He playfully blurs the thresholds between inside and outside, creating a building that is inviting, and would in all likelihood thrive in any area with pedestrians and street life. Alas, enclosed by fences and freeways, it usually sits awkwardly empty, a solid sculptural volume in a void.

What sort of public life can this new Rio generate? We might not yet have answers, but an anecdote might help us speculate about valuable aspects of “pre-Olympic” Rio that its residents often take for granted. In June of 2013, like so many others who had joined the protesting masses, I experienced situations which could quickly have devolved into mayhem. Reckless actions by police, like setting off smoke bombs indiscriminately, created potential for panic and trampling. On such occasions, what I saw prevail was a set of responses recognizable from having grown up in Rio. Abilities which its residents develop over years of living with often overcrowded public transportation, but also among the rowdy crowds of stadiums and street carnival. People touched each other, offering reassurance, calling for “calm,” and averting what in other places might have turned into a catastrophe. A society should not have to rely on such know-how as an antidote to overly aggressive police forces, or to inadequate transportation and sporting infrastructure. But the point remains that a capacity to share spaces and to coexist in physical proximity is a value we seldom recognize. Examples of unruly mobs and dangerous crowds certainly exist, and news reports generally do not shy away from broadcasting them. But in the occupied streets of Rio in June of 2013, or on any other given month, you could also see people looking after each other, and small acts of solidarity among strangers. It is harder to imagine how the sprawling city that results from Rio’s Olympic urbanism can forge that.

From a certain perspective, this might be a very minor gripe, or an argument too ungrounded in quantitative evidence. But what we do know is that after the Olympics, Rio is left with a new collection of impressive postcards. Bird’s-eye views of its Olympic Park are framed by majestic mountains and scintillating lakes. But residents of poor communities living by these bodies of water have been removed, against their will. And the pollution that suffocates the fauna and flora of these bodies of water has remained, despite the promises of authorities. Rio is left without knowing what could have been, if the resources mobilized to host the Olympics had 41. “The headline (“O Impossível Aconteceu”) appeared in the Folha do Rio, July 17, 1950.

42. Urban patterns of development that privilege a sprawling built environment are the least sustainable, yet they are the most subsidized by private-public arrangements—by taxpayers and the state—usually at the benefit of few private citizens and businesses. See, for instance, Pamela Blais’ Perverse Cities: Hidden Subsidies, Wonky Policy, and Urban Sprawl (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2011). On expenses related to the then “City of Music,” see “Cidade da Música é liberada para dois concertos,” G1, December 25 2008, http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/ Rio/0,MLX93503-5606,00.html, which mentions R$ 518 million by late 2008.
been applied toward other ends. Yet we can sense that by rushing toward the shiny Olympics, Rio leaves behind foreclosed futures.

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